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Before any part of MOP's claim would be subordinated in connection with
dividends paid by NOTM, it would have to be found that the loans forming
the basis for this part of the claim were for the purpose of permitting, or at
least necessary to, the dividend payments, and not for some other purpose,
such as the refunding of previous capital expenditures for improvements
and betterments. Rather, MOP's claim should have been subordinated to
the amount of NOTM's unwarranted dividends and the subordination
should have been clearly based on the payment of the dividends rather than
the loans.
4'
The test of whether an independent management would have consented
to the intercorporate transactions provides needed protection for creditors
and public stockholders of subsidiaries. Its underlying concept of a strict
fiducial bond is in step with the increasing judicial recognition of the Eepara-
tion between corporate ownership and control 12 and the consequent duty
owed by management to stockholders. Flexibly applied to require responsi-
ble management for the subsidiary, the Deep Rock doctrine can equitably
resolve the conflict of interests in the holding company structure.
TAX DEDUCTION OF THE EXPENSES OF
MISMANAGEMENT BY FIDUCIARIES'::
CONGRESS, seeking to tax an approximation of "net" rather than "gross"
income, has long allowed a tax deduction for "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses, now embodied in Section 23(a) (1) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code.' At first, 'business" was construed to include any activity
entered into for gain.2 But recently judicial interpretation became more
41. Cf. Indiana Service Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 7054, Decem-
her 14, 1946: "[U]tilities states that there is no evidence that such advances were made in
whole or in part for dividend purposes. While Utilities contends this, we do not believe
that there is any necessity to trace cash since the point is that the dividends should not
have been paid." Id. at 33-4.
42. See BaRLE AND MEAs, THE M610DRN CORPORATION AND PRIvATE Pn0PfTY 69-125
(1932).
* Commissioner v. Josephs, 16S F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948), ccrt. denicd, 335 U.S. 871
(1948).
1. The Revenue Act of 1913, 38 STAT. 167, § IIB, allowed as a deduction "the neces-
sary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business." By 191S the present form was
fixed: "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business . . ." 40 STAT. 1066, §214 (a) (1) (1918), Irr. REV. CODE §23(a) (1).
2. O.D. 537, 2 Cum. BuLL. 175 (1920) (expenses having reasonable relation to collec-
tion of income due an estate are deductible from gross income of estate), revoked, I.T.
1949]
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rigid: in 1941 the Supreme Court disallowed the deduction of payments
made in the management of a taxpayer's own investments, on the ground
that such an activity was not a "business." I This decision was nullified
when in 1942 Congress added Section 23(a) (2) to the Internal Revenue
Code, to allow the deduction of "ordinary and necessary" expenses "paid
. . . for the production . . . of income or for the management . . . of
property held for the production of income," whether or not connected
with the taxpayer's business.4 Yet twvo recent circuit court decisions, for
differing reasons, have denied to non-professional fiduciaries deductions
which their professional counterparts have been granted.
The distinction between the two types of fiduciaries for tax purposes
originated prior to the passage of 23(a) (2), in cases dealing with a trustee's
deduction of amounts paid to terminate a suit alleging mismanagement.
On the one hand, the taxpayer was allowed deductions for such expenses
where his fiduciary activities were of a scope large enough to constitute
a regular business. 5 But where the fiduciary activity was only occasional,
the deduction was denied on the ground that the settlement was not related
to a "business." s
3492, 1941-2 Cum. BULL. 187 (1941) ; O.D. 877, 4 Cum. BULL. 123 (1921) (rent of ofice
and cost of clerical help deductible from private investment income if reasonably related to
production or collection of that income), revoked, I.T. 3452, 1941-1 Gu,-. BULL. 205
(1941). For discussion of these and other early liberal Bureau constructions, see Brodsky
and McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses, 2 TAx L. Rsv. 39,
40-1 (1946).
Cf. Flint v. Stone-Tracy, 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (Corporation Tax Law of 1909).
3. Apparently the announced policy of the Bureau was applied inconsistently, for a
conflict appeared among the circuits on the question whether management of a taxpayer's
own securities was a "trade or business." Higgins v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1940)
(not a business) ; Kales v. Comm'r, 101 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1939) (business) ; DuPont v.
Deputy, 103 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1939) (business).
The conflict was settled by the Supreme Court's decision in Higgins v. Conin'r, 312
U.S. 212 (1941) (not a business). Two immediately following cases confirmed the Court's
strict interpretation, City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121 (1941)
(trustee managing investments not engaged in business) ; United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S.
127 (1941) (executor managing investments not engaged in business).
See discussion in Nahstoll, Non-Trade and Non-Business Expense Deductions: Section
23(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 1015 et seq. (1948) ; Brodsky
and McKibbin, supra note 2, at 41; Comment, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 212 (1946).
4. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions . . . in the case of
an individual, all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or mainte-
nance of property held for the production of income." Revenue Act of 1942, § 121, 56 STAT.
819 (1942), INT. REv. CODE § 23(a) (2).
The courts have often referred to the Higgins case as directly responsible for the enact-
ment of Section 23(a) (2), e.g., McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57, 61 (1944) ; Bowers v.
Lumpkin, 140 F.2d 927, 928 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944).
5. John Abbott, 38 B.T.A. 1290 (1938); Bishop Trust Co., 47 B.T.A. 737 (1942).
6. Stuart v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 368 (1st Cir. 1936), aff'g 32 B.T.A. 574 (1935), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 575 (1936) ; Stephen H. Tallman, 37 B.T.A. 1060 (1938).
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While the courts might well have interpreted the broad wording of 23(a)
(2) as abolishing this distinction, they have not done so. In Edward Wf?.
Clark,7 the Tax Court held that expenses were deductible as "paid for the
production of income" only when actually prerequisite to production of
income, and excluded from this category the expense of defending a suit
for mismanagement. This thesis was undermined by dicta in Trust of
Bingham v. Commissioner,9 where the Supreme Court, allowing deduction
of expenses incurred in the management of income-producing property
stressed that 23(a) (2) should be interpreted in pari maleria with the pro-
vision of 23(a) (1) permitting business deductions. 10 In Julius A. Heide,"
the Tax Court, applying the Bingham reasoning to compromise settlements
of mismanagement suits, discarded its Clark rule on the ground that a pro-
fessional fiduciary is allowed a deduction for such expenses under 23(a) (1).12
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, was not swayed by
the Bingham dicta. Although refraining from a return to the Clarb rule,
that court reversed the Tax Court's Heide decision, opining that expendi-
tures occasioned by the trustee's negligence could not be construed as
"ordinary and necessary" for the production of income.13 Assuming that
the compromise settlement indicated Heide's negligence, 4 the court held
that the resulting expense could not be deducted for tax purposes. The
negative implication was that in the absence of negligence or wilful mis-
feasance expenses incurred in defending mismanagement suits would be
deductible, even though the expenses were not prerequisite to the pro-
duction of income.
Regardless of the merits of its negligence theory, the Second Circuit seems
to have attached undue significance to Heide's compromise settlement. A
compromise legally settles neither rights nor liabilities.,, If deductibility
is to depend on the question of negligence, therefore, the issue should nor-
mally be raised de iovo when a deduction is sought,"0 and not inferred, as
in the H-eide opinion, from the mere fact of the compromise settlement.
7. 2 T.C. 676 (1943).
S. "Obviously the expense [$1250 expended in defense of suit for mismanagement]
vas not paid or incurred 'for the production or collection of income.' No income vas pro-
duced by the expenditure, nor was any collected"' Edward WN. Clark, 2 T.C. 676, 679
(1943). Cf. Samuel E. Jacobs, T.C. femo. Op., Dkt. No. 10,6S1 (1943).
9. 325 U.S. 365 (1945); see 58 H.xv. L. REV. 1254; 1 T,-x L. RE%. 105 (1945).
10. 325 U.S. 365, 373 (1945).
11. 8 T.C. 314 (1947).
12. Id. at 317.
13. Comm'r v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948).
14. "[T]he expenses so deducted . . . should not be such as he interposes himself, as
little so, when his attention has flagged as when he has been deliberately unfaithful to his
trust." Id. at 701.
15. Waltz v. Ellinghouse, 165 F2d 596, 601-3 (8th Cir. 1948), and cases there cited.
16. Cf. Levitt & Sons v. Nunan, 142 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1944) ; International Shoe Co.,
38 B.T.A. 81, 95 (1938). But cf. Jerry Rossman Corp., 10 T.C. 468 (1948); Comm'r v.
19491
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Perhaps because of the practical difficulties inherent in such a de ilovo
trial of an issue already settled amicably by the parties, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit rejected the Heide rule in Commissioner v, Josephs,17
But instead of following the Tax Court's interpretation of the Bingham
dicta, the court in effect reverted to the Clark rule. A deduction for com-
promise settlement of a mismanagement suit, it held, could not be allowed
because the expenses did not stem from conditions which "stand in the
path of" the production of income.18
Both the Heide and Josephs decisions, which rest on strict constructions
of "ordinary and necessary expense paid for production of income," seem
contrary to the clear intent of Congress in its enactment of a section specif-
ically designed to supplement 23(a) (1).11 Under 23(a) (1), which similarly
permits deduction of "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
carrying on a trade or business," expenses of defending suits for mismanage-
ment by a professional fiduciary have been deductible even where stemming
from negligent or fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty.20 The only litigation
Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728
(1945).
17. 168 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948), reversing 8 T.C. 583 (1947), ecrt. denicd, 335 U.S.
842 (1948).
Josephs, primarily engaged in the scrap iron business, had agreed to serve as co-ad-
ministrator of a friend's estate, on condition that he should receive compensation for his
services. Nine years later, several of the heirs, disgruntled with the management of the
family business, charged the administrator with neglect, and asked damages of $300,000.
The dispute was settled by agreement, Josephs paying $10,000 in full settlement of any
liability he might have. Josephs sought to deduct this $10,000, plus $1,500 attorneys' fees
paid in connection with the litigation.
The dispute originated with a petition asking for an accounting and other relief filed
by the heirs. Since Josephs had entered upon his office as administrator with the expecta-
tion of realizing income and the expenses were a direct result of his activity as adminhis-
trator, the Tax Court regarded it as immaterial that after the controversy arose, he agreed
to forego the compensation and fees to which he was entitled in order to promote a settle-
ment, 8 T.C. 583 (1947). The Eighth Circuit did not question this interpretation, Commn'r
v. Heide, 168 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948).
18. "[It was not enough that an expense be incurred in carrying on the trust; ...
to be allowable as incurred for the production of income, the expense must be one result-
ing 'from conditions which stand in the path of' the production of income." 168 F.2d 233,
237 (8th Cir. 1948).
19. Note 22 infra.
20. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928) (accounting) ; Central Trust Co,
v. Burnet, 45 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (fraud) ; Great Island Holding Corp., 5 T.C. 150
(1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL. 3 (1945) (mismanagement) ; John Abbott, 38 B.T.A, 1290
(1938) (mismanagement) ; Henry F. Cochrane, 23 B.T.A. 202, 208 (1931) (mismanage-
ment) ; I.T. 1853, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 124 ,(1923) (amounts paid to compromise action for
breach of fiduciary duty deductible) ; O.D. 1091, 5 Cum. BULL. 139 (1921) (same). Cf.
S.M. 4078, V-1 Cum. BULL. 226 (1926) (malpractice) ; Anderson v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 457
(10th Cir. 1936) (negligence) ; International Shoe Co., 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938), aeq., 1938-2
Cum. BULL. 17 (1938) (conspiracy to injure) ; Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th
Cir. 1935) (fraud), where the court stated: "We cannot agree that private wrongdoing in
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payments for which deductions have been disallowed despite direct relation
to a business activity are those incurred by way of statutory fine or penalty,
a decision based on "public policy." 21 Thus both the Heide and Josephs
decisions would have been contrary to the line of precedent if those cases
had involved professional fiduciaries.
Congress having inserted Section 23(a) (2) in the Internal Revenue Code
to remedy the inequitable treatment of non-business income under the
then existing law, 22 the expenses of innocent mismanagement by a casual,
the course of business is extraordinary within the meaning of the taxing statute allowing
deductions for 'ordinary and necessary expenses."' Id. at 360.
Amounts paid in settlement of any liability for mismanagement occasionally have been
held deductible as losses not compensated by insurance or otherwise, under Section 23(e)
(individuals) or Section 23(f) (corporations), e.g., Robert S. Farrell, 44 B.T.A. 238
(1941) ; Bishop Trust Co., 47 B.T.A. 737 (1942). But the "loss" argument more often is
dismissed summarily, Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 152 (1923); Levitt &
Sons v. Nunan, 142 F.2d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Hales-Mfullaly v. Comm'r, 131 F.2d 509,
512 (10th Cir. 1942) ; B. f. Peyton, 10 B.T.A. 1129 (1928).
21. At first the Treasury took the position that payments of statutory fines imposed for
negligence or delinquency were deductible, L.O. 926, 1' Cusm. Bu.L. 241 (1919). But at
present no amount paid as a statutory fine or penalty is deductible as an "ordinary and
necessary expense," e.g., Jerry Rossman Corp., 10 T.C. 46S (1948) (Emergency Price
Control Act); Comm'r v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945),
ccrt. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) (state anti-trust act) ; Standard Oil v. Comm'r, 129 F.2d
363 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 628 (1942), rehcaring dcnicd, 319 U.S. 784
(1943) (Sherman Act); Universal Atlas Cement Co., 9 T.C. 971 (1947) (state anti-
trust act) ; Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 852 (1941).
But attorneys' fees and other expenses of such suits now are deductible, vwhether or not
the defense is successful, Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943) ; Comm'r V. Longhorn
Portland Cement Co., supra, acq., 1944 Ctm. BULL. 18 (1944); Universal Atlas Cement
Co., supra; Lynch, Legal Expenses as Deductions frow Income, 12 FoD. L. RE%,. 8 (1943);
Note, 57 HARV. L. REv. 109 (1943).
22. "Under existing law taxpayers are allowed to deduct expenses incurred in connec-
tion with a trade or business. Nontrade or nonbusiness income, however, is also subject to
tax. It would therefore be equitable to provide for the deduction of expenses incurred in
the production of such nontrade or nonbusiness income." Statement of Randolph Paul, Tax
Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings before Committee on Ways a:d ;"cans
on Revenue Rezision of 1942,77th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, 88 (1942).
"The existing law allows taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in connection %- ith a
trade or business. Due partly to the inadequacy of the statute and partly to court decisions,
nontrade or nonbusiness expenses are not deductible, although nontrade or nfnbusiness in-
come is fully subject to tax. The bill corrects this inequity by allowing all of the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred for the production or collection of income or for
the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of in-
come. Thus, whether or not the expense is in connection with the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness, if it is expended in the pursuit of income or in connection with property held for the
production of income, it is allowable." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942).
See further, 88 CoNG. REc. 6376 (1942) ; Brodsky and McKibbin, supra note 2.
Thus the Treasury sought to have Congress remove the inequity created by its own
labor. If it had permitted the continuance of a liberal interpretation of "business," see note
2 supra, no problem would have arisen. This type of governmental nearsightedness has been
roundly criticized. See Maguire, Federal Revemie-Internal or Infernal?, 21 TA.xxs 77,
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or non-professional, fiduciary under 23(a) (2) should receive the same treat-
ment accorded the similar expenses of a professional fiduciary under 23(a) (1).
The House and Senate reports indicate that "ordinary and necessary" as
used in 23(a) (2) should be interpreted by the judicial test applied under
(23)(a) (1), that the expenses "must be reasonable in amount and bear a
reasonable and proximate relation to" the production of income.3 And the
Supreme Court has declared that 23(a) (2) provides for a class of non-busi-
ness deductions coextensive with the business deductions allowed by 23(a)
(1), in that "ordinary and necessary" is to be similarly construed.
2 4
The inequity which Congress intended to eliminate becomes apparent
when one considers the fairly common court practice of appointing an in-
dividual and a trust company to act as co-administrators of an estate. If
a suit for innocent mismanagement arises and is settled, then the professional
trust company can deduct its payments, while the individual, carrying on
what for him is an isolated transaction, can not. Once the requirement is
made that the "non-business" expense be directly prerequisite to the pro-
duction of income if it is to be deductible, the casual trustee loses deductions
not only for expenses in terminating a mismanagement suit, but possibly
also for the expenses of determining income tax liability 25 and even for the
costs incurred in successfully defending a mismanagement suit.
There is no public policy which forbids deduction of mismanagement
expenses. Fiduciary negligence would not be encouraged: few fiduciaries
would be delinquent solely because, if sued and held liable, they could get a
tax deduction partially offsetting their loss. Even if there were a temptation,
it would not justify different treatment for casual as opposed to professional
fiduciaries. There should be no distinction made here in view of the clear
Congressional intent to make connection with the taxpayer's "business"
immaterial.
123 (1943) ; Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be
Narrowly Construed As A Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. R.v. 1142, 1147
(1943). The Josephs and Heide cases indicate that the Bureau is now fighting its way to-
wards the re-establishment of at least part of the inequity it so recently asked Congress to
remove.
23. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942); S=. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942). This test was subsequently promulgated by the Treasury De-
partment as a guide to the interpretation of Section 23(a) (2), U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29,23
(a)-1S (1942).
24. Bingham v. Comm'r, 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945). See p. 783 supra.
25. Expenses of determining income tax liability are at present deductible, provided
that the litigation arises from a transaction which was originally entered into for profit,
Howard E. Cammack, 5 T.C. 467 (1945); Charles N. Manning, 3 T.C. 853 (1944), aff'd,
148 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1945) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15 (1945).
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